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In this paper the author considers permissibility, i.e. impermissibility of the use of 
force in international law due to enormous human rights violations (massive crimes 
against civilian population, ethnic cleansing) within borders of a particular coun-
try, as well as viewpoints of scholars in international law on humanitarian interven-
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Let God Almighty...charitably condescend to enlighten the mind 
and soul of the people of this city, so that they may live honourably, 
without causing injury or damage to other people, so that everybody 
may enjoy the same rights, and so that due justice, whereby the world 
is generally governed according to the legal order, may be administered 
even-handedly...
And indeed, it is of their own free will that every day people let 
unfettered greed, the enemy of peace that does not respect God’s char-
ity, give rise to disputes, conflicts and disagreements among nations, so 
that the world could not be governed properly if justice did not curb its 
constant onslaught...
From the preface and introduction to the Statute of the Town of 
Split (1312), 2nd (revised) edition, Književni krug, Split, 1987.
I
The maintenance of international peace and security is a fundamental aim 
of the Collective Security System which is based on, among other things, the 
complex obligation of states to take concerted action. The legal framework of 
the UN Collective Security System1 is regulated by Chapters VI (Pacific Settle-
1 It was preceded by the collective security systems provided by the Holy Alliance (1815-1830) 
and by the League of Nations (1919-1946). 
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ment of Disputes), VII (Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of 
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, and VIII (Regional Arrangements) of the UN 
Charter. Under general international law the threat or use of force is forbidden.2 
This principle is of an imperative character. However, there are two exceptions: 
Article 51 of the Charter relating to individual or collective self-defence3, and 
Article 39 whereby the Security Council determines the existence of any threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and makes recommenda-
tions, or decides what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 414 and 
425, to maintain or restore international peace and security. According to Article 
53(1) the Security Council, where appropriate, utilizes such regional arrange-
ments or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement 
action is to be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without 
the authorization of the Security Council. Therefore, the cooperation of all five 
permanent members of the Security Council is an essential political proviso. If 
this condition is not fulfilled, the entire collective security system is blocked up. 
2 According to Article 2(4):
 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
 Article 2(7): 
 Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
3 Article 51:
 Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures 
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems neces-
sary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
4 Article 41:
 The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Na-
tions to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic 
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, 
and the severance of diplomatic relations.
5 Article 42:
 Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inad-
equate or have proved be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may 
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the 
United Nations.
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Thus, the Council is politically the most important body of the United Nations 
which has not only authority but also primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.6
In the UN Charter there are no rules concerning the use of force on grounds of 
an urgent humanitarian need – in order to prevent mass crimes against a civilian 
population, ethnic cleansing or serious offences against human rights in the terri-
tory of a state, since the framers of the Charter focused their attention exclusively 
on the prevention of armed conflicts among states (such as the ones that gave rise 
to World War Two) and of acts of aggression. It is clear that at its inception it was 
not intended for it to cope with crisis involving large scale violations of human 
rights within a given state’s boundaries.7 Thus, modern international law forbids 
humanitarian intervention. Under Article 2(7) of the Charter, nothing contained 
in the present Charter authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, except in the case of 
the application of enforcement measures provided under Chapter VII.8 However, 
this high threshold, limiting the application of national and international law, is 
gradually becoming lower. Gross violations of human rights, which are now dealt 
with by international agreements adopted after the UN Charter, can never again 
be considered exclusive questions of national law and therefore beyond the ju-
risdiction of the UN system. Therefore it is particularly important to mention the 
Report of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on the activity of the Organization, 
presented on 20th September 1999 at the last session of the General Assembly in 
the 20th century. The report points out that: 
State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of 
globalization and international cooperation.
In the context of the by-gone tragic events (Rwanda, Kosovo) it states:
While the genocide in Rwanda will define for our generation the consequenc-
es of inaction in the face of mass murder, the more recent conflict in Kosovo 
has prompted important questions about the consequences of action in the 
absence of complete unity on the part of the international community. It has 
6 Article 24 (1): 
 In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on 
the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behalf.
7 F. Francioni, Of War, Humanity and Justice: International Law after Kosovo, Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 93, 4 (2000), p. 107.
8 In order to understand the principle of non-intervention in the internal jurisdiction of a state it 
is necessary to return to the time when the Charter was adopted. It was written by the winners 
of World War Two. It should be remembered that the legal experts in those times regarded the 
genocide of German Jews as exclusively a matter of domestic rather than international law.
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cast in stark relief the dilemma of what has been called humanitarian inter-
vention: on one side, the question of the legitimacy of an action taken by a 
regional organization without a United Nations mandate; on the other, the 
universally recognized imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic 
violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences. The in-
ability of the international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile these 
two equally compelling interests – universal legitimacy and effectiveness in 
defence of human rights – can only be viewed as a tragedy.
Therefore, the challenging fundamental task of the Security Council and the 
United Nations as a whole is
… to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations 
of human rights – wherever they may take place – should not be allowed to 
stand.9
II
The NATO armed forces, without a previous permission by the Security 
Council,10 launched air raids on various targets in Yugoslavia on 24 March and 
ended them by official order on 20 June 1999. Those air raids were preceded by 
massive violations of human rights and crimes against the civilian population in 
Kosovo and a mass exodus from Kosovo.11 The intervention was not conducted 
9 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, G.A.O.R., 54th Sess., 
4th Plen. Mtg., A/ 54/1, 20 September 1999, pp. 1-3. http://www.un.org/news/Press/
docs/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html
10 No official permission was given, but at the press conference held by UK Minister of Defence 
G. Robertson in London on 25 March 1999, a day after the air raids began, the expression sup-
port was used:
 …NATO’s action has received support inside the UN Security Council from the United States, 
France, Argentina, Slovenia, Malaysia, Gambia, Bahrain, the Netherlands and Gabon. Outside 
of Russia and China, only Namibia disagreed with the military action in the Security Coun-
cil, and in the wider United Nations we know of only opposition from India and understand-
ably Belarus and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia itself. – Quoted in: M. Dixon, R. Mc-
Corquodale, Cases & Materials on International Law, fourth edition, Oxford, 2003, p 547. 
Among the NATO states, the UK was the foremost supporter and promoter of the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, claiming:
 …that the interpretation of Article 2(4) has changed over time; that international law in this 
field has developed to meet new situations…
 …when faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe which a government has shown 
it is unwilling or unable to prevent or is actively promoting, the international community should 
intervene – See: M. D. Evans, International Law, Oxford, 2003, pp. 595-597.
11 The reality of the human rights violation in Kosovo before and after the intervention is 
documented in: OSCE Reports, Kosovo/Kosovo – Human Rights in Kosovo: As Seen, As 
Told. Volume I, October 1998-June 1999, Part III: The violation of human rights in Kosovo. 
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or authorized on the basis of the regulations provided in Chapter VIII of the Char-
ter. The Security Council adopted particular resolutions on Kosovo in 1998,12 but 
they do not (contrary to the opinion of the USA, the UK and France) contain any 
elements which would, as in the case of the Security Council’s Resolution 678 (of 
29 November 1990) concerning Iraq, provide a formula for permitting the use of 
force.13 Resolutions on Kosovo did not in any way, explicit or implicit, authorize 
the use of force as a measure by which the humanitarian catastrophe would be 
stopped. Formally, armed intervention without permission granted by the Secu-
rity Council is a forbidden act of aggression against a sovereign state.
The intervention set in motion an avalanche of general interest on the part of 
the academic and professional public for a whole range of questions about which 
even today, after five years, discussions still continue. The international commu-
nity has not reached a consensus on this matter. In the science of international law 
the use of force on grounds of an extreme humanitarian need is defined as humani-
tarian intervention.14 As a matter of fact, the point at issue is the use of force as an 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part1/ch4.htm
12 RES/1160 of 31 March 1998; RES/1199 of 23 September 1998; RES/1203 of 24 October 
1998.
13 According to this Resolution the states that cooperated with the government of Kuwait (in 
exile) were authorized: “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 
(1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security 
in the area…”
14 On humanitarian intervention see: I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by 
States, Oxford, 1963, pp. 338-342; Principles of Public International Law, sixth edition, Ox-
ford, 2003, pp 710-712; J. I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 4 (1999), pp. 834-841; C. M. Chinkin, Ko-
sovo: A “Good” or “ Bad” War, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 4 (1999), pp. 
841-847; V. Đ. Degan, Intervencija i međunarodno pravo (Intervention and international law), 
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Rijeci, 4 (1983), pp.169-200.; Humanitarian intervention (NATO 
action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999), u: L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man, 2003, pp. 233-260.; M. Dixon, R. McCorquodale, Cases and Materials 
on International Law, fourth edition, Oxford, 2003, pp 546-557.; V. Dimitrijević, O. Račić, 
V. Đerić, T. Papić, V. Petrović, S. Obradović, Osnovi međunarodnog javnog prava (Funda-
mentals of Public International Law), Belgrade, 2005, pp. 274-277; R. Etinski, Application of 
Law in The Case of NATO Military Intervention Against the FR of Yugoslavia, Jugoslovenska 
revija za međunarodno pravo, Vol. 46, 1-3, Belgrade, 1999, pp. 44-52; Malcolm D. Evans, In-
ternational Law, Oxford, 2003, pp. 595-599; T. M. Franck, Legitimacy after Kosovo and Iraq, 
in: V. Crnić-Grotić, M. Matulović (eds.), International Law and the Use of Force at the Turn of 
Centuries, Rijeka, 2005, pp. 69-85; F. Francioni, Of War, Humanity and Justice: International 
Law After Kosovo, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Vol. 93, 4 (2000), pp. 107-
126; M. Geistlinger, The attack on SRJ – an attack on Public International Law, Law and Poli-
tics, Vol. 1, N°4, 2000, pp. 397-408; R. Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and 
How We Use it, Oxford, 2003, pp. 245-253; J. L Holzgrefe, R.O. Keohane (eds.), Humani-
tarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, Cambridge, 2003; B. Krivokapić, 
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answer to widespread and grave violations of human rights, which are, according 
to Vukas, constantly present throughout the history of the human race. Christine 
Chinkin is very critical of favouring the commitment to humanitarian values:
…the commitment to human rights that humanitarian intervention supposedly 
entails does not mean equality of rights worldwide. The human rights of some 
people are more worth protecting than those of others. Military intervention 
on behalf of the victims of human rights abuses has not occurred in, inter alia, 
Sudan, Afghanistan or Ethiopia. It was woefully inadequate and delayed in 
Rwanda…Such selectivity undermines moral authority…
The case of Kosovo may have highlighted the continuing chasm between human 
rights rhetoric and reality. It does not resolve the way this can be bridged.
These are the reasons for the following conclusion:
Finally, the Kosovo intervention shows that the West continues to script in-
ternational law, even while it ignores the constitutional safeguards of the in-
ternational legal order. The instances since 1990 that are most frequently 
cited as evidence that humanitarian intervention is evolving as a doctrine of 
post-Charter international law were initiated by the West and involved action 
in non-Western states (Iraq, Somalia and Haiti).15
In the analysis of different views on the permissibility or impermissibility of 
the so-called humanitarian intervention it is necessary to define the concept itself. 
According to Degan:
Međunarodno pravo – koreni, razvoj, perspektive (International Law – Sources, Development, 
Perspectives), Belgrade, 2006, pp. 213-221; S. Murphy, Humanitarian  Intervention: The 
United Nations in an Evolving World Order, 1996; G. Nolte, Kosovo und Konstitutional-
isierung: Zur humanitären Intervention der NATO–Staaten, 59 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 4 (1999), pp. 941-960; M. Paunović, “Humanitarna inter-
vencija” kao zloupotreba načela zabrane upotrebe sile u međunarodnom pravu (“Humanitarian 
intervention” as an abuse of the principle of prohibition of the use of force in international 
law), Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, Vol. 46, 1-3, Belgrade, 1999, pp.149-159; 
D. Petrova, Eastern Europe After Kosovo – The War and the Human-Rights Community, 
East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 8. 3 (1999); F. Rigaux, Aspects historiques de 
l’intervention “humanitaire”: une leçon qui demeure, in V. Crnić-Grotić, M. Matulović (eds.), 
International Law and the use of force at the turn of centuries, Rijeka, 2005, pp. 207-219; O. 
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 82, 1984, 
pp. 1620-1646; B. Simma, NATO, the UN and Use of Force: Legal Aspects, European Journal 
of International Law, Vol. 10, 1 (1999), pp.1-22; J. Verhoeven, L’intervention d’humanité: un 
“pouvoir”? in V.Crnić-Grotić, M. Matulović (eds.), International Law and the use of force at 
the turn of centuries, Rijeka, 2005, pp. 221-238; R. Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugo-
slavia, American Journal of International Law, 4 (1999), pp. 828-834.
15 C. M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
93, 4 (1999), pp. 846-847.
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Humanitarian intervention (intervention d’humanité) is itself an armed ac-
tion undertaken under exceptional circumstances by a State or a group of 
States against a Government of a foreign State which is continuously com-
mitting widespread atrocities and other international crimes against its own 
population. Its purpose is to stop the crimes.16
Holzgrefe and Keohane define humanitarian intervention as:
…the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the funda-
mental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the 
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.17
Paunović thinks that “humanitarian intervention” is:
…a coined term according to which a state or a group of states may inter-
vene in the affairs of another state if that state does not observe the generally 
adopted principles of humanitarian law, and especially for the purpose of 
saving the lives of a particular group of people who are endangered by the 
state in which the intervention is to take place or whom the state in question 
is not able to protect, irrespective of whether they are foreign nationals or its 
own citizens.18
The concept of the right of humanitarian intervention has been formulated in 
many different ways. The most comprehensive investigation of opinions repre-
senting the views of the majority of experts in international law was published by 
Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale in their already mentioned study Cases 
and Materials on International Law. First of all, the starting point should be the 
view that prevailed at the time the operation was conducted (1999). I. Brownlie 
reminds us that:
16 V. Đ. Degan, Humanitarian intervention (NATO action against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in 1999) in L.C.Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man, 2003, p.238.
17 J. L. Holzgrefe, R.O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas, Cambridge, 2003, p. 18.
 On the concept of intervention of humaneness, from which the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention evolved see: V. Dimitrijević, O. Račić, V. Đerić, T. Papić, V. Petrović, S. Obradović, 
Osnovi međunarodnog javnog prava (Fundamentals of Public International Law), Belgrade, 
2005, p. 275.
18 M. Paunović, “Humanitarna intervencija” kao zloupotreba načela zabrane upotrebe sile u 
međunarodnom pravu (“Humanitarian intervention” as an abuse of the principle of prohibition 
of the use of force in international law), Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, Vol. 46, 
1-3, Belgrade, 1999, p. 149. 
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…there was little or no authority and little or no state practice to support the 
right of individual States to use force on humanitarian grounds in interna-
tional law. The legal situation may be different in cases where the Security 
Council or a regional organization takes such action in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter. State practice has been overwhelmingly hostile to 
the concept of intervention on such a selective and subjective basis.19 
First of all, therefore, two questions must be answered. First, does interven-
tion have a legal basis or framework in the UN Charter and in international law? 
And second, if it does, may the bounds of permissibility be crossed in the last 
extremity, where all ethical and humanitarian preconditions are satisfied, and can 
intervention be considered just, humane and moral and therefore a valid reason 
for amending the system of the Charter into a new and more flexible system 
(according to some writers, a system more appropriate to the occasions of wide-
spread and gross violations of human rights)? In order to provide an answer to 
the first question one should first state the following: on the one hand, the UN 
Charter system of collective security is ineffective20 (it often ended in fiasco, 
the most serious instance was the internal conflict in Somalia, 1992-1995), anti-
quated, maladjusted to new international relations and situations, and on the other 
hand, there are no legal grounds for permitting the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes. The legal right of humanitarian intervention is not in harmony with the 
United Nations Charter. Brownlie and Apperley are clear about it:
…There is no sufficient evidence of the existence of a legal right for States, 
whether acting individually or jointly, to use force for humanitarian purpos-
es. The alleged right is not compatible with the United Nations Charter. Thus 
it is not surprising that the sources of international law covering a period of 
40 years fail to provide any substantial support for the legality of humanitar-
ian intervention.21
19 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, sixth edition, Oxford, 2003, p. 711.
20 Fourteen years ago Rudolf warned about a new phenomenon in international relations, i.e. 
the non-functioning of the mechanism of collective security because of the bizarre autarchy of 
states. – D. Rudolf, Postignuća i utopije (Achievements and Utopias), Zagreb, 2005, p.210.
21 I. Brownlie, C. Apperley, Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law 
Aspects, 49 International and Comparative Law Quaterly, 878 (2000), pp. 886-894. 
In his book from 1963 Brownlie emphasizes:
 It must be admitted that humanitarian intervention has not been expressly condemned by ei-
ther the League Covenant, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the United Nations Charter. Indeed, 
such intervention would not constitute resort to force as an instrument of national policy. It 
is necessary nevertheless to have regard to the general effect and the underlying assumptions 
of the juridical developments of the period since 1920. In particular it is extremely doubtful if 
this form of intervention has survived the express condemnations of intervention which have 
occurred in recent times or the general prohibition of resort to force to be found in the United 
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According to Geistlinger, 
NATO attack on FRY was neither legal nor legitimate, nor can it be justified 
under present public international law. It must be considered as an attempt to 
revolutionarily amend the United Nations Charter.22
At this point the opinion of Franck must be mentioned: 
I have tried to sketch the conceptual skein of my theory of legitimacy, at least 
insofar as it may have relevance to developments in Kosovo and Iraq. I sus-
pect that there is a widespread sense of unease about the state of Charter-
based international law applicable to war as a result of those two recourses 
to force. Has practice made the rules obsolete? 
To paraphrase Kant: in this aspect of international law – the right to use 
force – what is true in practice is also likely to be true in theory. Put another 
way, the question is whether the Charter rules pertaining to the use of force 
have become indeterminate, through contemporary usage and perception, so 
as to have forfeited their legitimacy.
Law’s legitimacy is not preserved by refusal to entertain rule-change, and 
change can come about in various ways. As long as the process results in a 
common acknowledgment of the reformed rule’s universal application and 
of its specific content, change-through-practice will not undermine a rule’s 
legitimacy.23
The answer to the second question seems more complex. Although the viola-
tion of particular rules and principles at a particular moment may be the only pos-
sible alternative in the name of a more just order in the international community, 
in practice it is not certain that doubt will not be cast on consistency in the com-
mitment to humanitarian values. The linkage of the legally impermissible with 
feelings of humaneness and morality has always been a privilege of the powerful. 
O. Schacter concludes:
States strong enough to intervene and sufficiently interested in doing so tend 
to have political motives. They have a strong temptation to impose a political 
solution in their own national interest. Most governments are acutely sensi-
Nations Charter. – See: I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, 
1963, pp. 338-342, quoted in M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, o. c., p. 547.
22 M. Geistlinger, The attack on SRJ – an attack on Public International Law, Law and Politics, 
Vol. 1, 4 (2000), p. 397.
23 T. M. Franck, Legitimacy after Kosovo and Iraq, in V.Crnić-Grotić, M. Matulović (eds.), Inter-
national Law and the Use of Force at the Turn of Centuries, Rijeka, 2005. p. 72, p.79.
Vesna Barić Punda: (IM)PERMISSIBILITY OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION; 29-49 
ADRIAS svezak 14, 2007.
38
tive to this danger and show no disposition to open article 2(4) up to a broad 
exception for humanitarian intervention by means of armed force.24 
A relevant statement of international law on intervention regarded as a mani-
festation of political force and power is contained in the judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case. The Court ruled that the 
measures taken on 12 and 13 November 1946 by the British Royal Army to clear 
mines in the territorial sea of Albany were acts which violated Albany’s sover-
eignty and which were contrary to international law. Such acts represent a new 
and special application of the theory of intervention. The Court confuted the Brit-
ish argument that the intervention was not contrary to the rules of international 
law and pronounced against the alleged right of intervention:
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifesta-
tion of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious 
abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international 
organization, find a place in international law. Intervention is perhaps still 
less admissible in the particular form it would take here; for, from the nature 
of things, it would be reserved for the most powerful States, and might easily 
lead to perverting the administration of international justice itself.25
Not even today, after six decades, have any substantial changes been effected 
in international law. It is even less certain that the use of force (individually or 
jointly) in some regions or in some situations in the world will not be a demon-
stration of force and power, with the humanitarian motivation used only as an 
excuse for action. Then, we can only speak of the domination of politics over law. 
It is for this reason that the United States, in spite of all criticism levelled at the 
system of collective security, are still the only institution which truly represents 
and must represent the international community as a whole. In the mentioned 
report of 1999, Kofi Annan asks a warning question:
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States and 
groups of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms 
for enforcing international law, one might ask: Is there not a danger of such 
interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created 
after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future 
interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might invoke these prec-
edents, and in what circumstances? 
24 O. Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 82, 1984, 
pp. 1629.
25 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania) ICJ Reports 1949, p. 35. 
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His conclusion could perhaps be an answer to all questions concerning these 
dilemmas:
The Charter is a living document, whose high principles still define the as-
pirations of peoples everywhere for lives of peace, dignity and development. 
Nothing in the Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond 
borders.
Indeed, its very letter and spirit are the affirmation of those fundamental 
human rights. In short, it is not the deficiencies of the Charter which have 
brought us to this juncture, but our difficulties in applying its principles to a 
new era; an era when strictly traditional notions of sovereignty can no longer 
do justice to the aspirations of peoples everywhere to attain their fundamen-
tal freedoms. 26
Franck’s view is as follows:
Whether or not all, or, at first only some, of the permanent members formally 
agree to such an up-dating of the practices, the rules are changing. After Ko-
sovo, it is clear that when a large preponderance of states are convinced that 
a muscular rescue is necessary and urgent, they will not much cavil at action 
being taken by a coalition of the willing whose bona fides is demonstrable 
and generally acknowledged. Change may occur through negotiated agree-
ment or by patterns of conduct that skirt the rules. Either is likely, eventually, 
to achieve normative reform.27
III
All discussions concerning permissibility or impermissibility of NATO’s 
intervention in 1999 on grounds of widespread and grave violations of human 
rights are in fact discussions about a conflict between international law and in-
ternational reality. Regardless of the degree of development of international law 
or the degree of recognition of its principles at a given time, these principles 
are skirted or violated in concrete international relations. International law may 
forbid the application of force, but it has not yet succeeded in changing power 
relations among states or in eliminating all other reasons which give rise to the 
use and abuse of force.28 According to Francioni there are four entirely different 
views on NATO’s intervention:
26 Report of the Secretary-General, 1999, pp 2-3.
27 T. M. Franck, o. c., p 79.
28 V. Đ. Degan, Intervencija i međunarodno pravo (Intervention and international law), Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta u Rijeci, 4 (1983), p.169.
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According to the first view, the intervention should be regarded as lawful 
because of the overarching importance of human rights in contemporary inter-
national law and of the obsolescence of the United Nations monopoly on the 
authorization of force with the attendant blocking power of the veto by one of 
the five permanent members. However, there are few contemporary writers who 
acknowledge humanitarian intervention as an exception to the principle of pro-
hibition of the use of force in international relations. Francioni holds that this 
view would open the flood gates to unilateral interventions, thus making the well 
intended objective of justice and human rights depend on the policy decision of a 
handful of powerful states.
The possibility of dangerous boomerang effects would not be excluded either. 
That is why Akehurst pays attention to the following:
...claims by same states that they are entitled to use force to prevent violations 
of human rights may make other states reluctant to accept legal obligations 
concerning human rights.29
According to the second view, the armed intervention is destitute of any legal 
justification in the law of the Charter and in customary international law, thus 
amounting to an act of aggression. Such intervention is considered to be a basic 
criterion for defining aggression under UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974.30 It is a crime against the international peace and 
involves international responsibility. According to Francioni, this standpoint, al-
though technically correct, rests too much on the status quo and on the comfort-
able cold war notion that non-defensive use of force is always impermissible 
without Security Council authorization.
In the Serbian science of international law the views are unanimous: NATO’s 
intervention in SR Yugoslavia was an act of aggression.31 Especially interesting 
29 Quoted in M. Dixon and R. McCorquodale, o. c., p 548.
30 Article 3 (b) defines (among other things) the following as an act of aggression:
 Bombardment by the armed forces of a States against the territory of another State or the use 
of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State.
 Articles 2 and 3 define different forms of the use of force and different acts and actions that 
shall be regarded as aggression.
31 See: M. Mitić, Agresija NATO na Jugoslaviju – negacija međunarodnog prava (NATO aggres-
sion against Yugoslavia – negation of international law), Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno 
pravo, Vol. 46, 1-3, Belgrade, 1999, pp. 77-88; M. Starčević, Agresija NATO protiv Jugoslavi-
je i međunarodno humanitarno pravo (NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and international 
humanitarian law), Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, Vol. 46, 1-3, Belgrade, 1999, 
pp.135-148; B. Krivokapić, Agresija NATO na Jugoslaviju – grubo kršenje normi unutrašnjeg 
prava država agresora (NATO aggression against Yugoslavia – gross violation of the inter-
nal law norms of the aggressor states, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, Vol. 46, 
1-3, Belgrade, 1999, pp. 89-109; NATO Aggression Against Yugoslavia – Wanton Violation of 
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are the views of M. Šahović. He examines NATO’s armed intervention from a 
legal versus a political standpoint or, one could say, from an international versus 
a Yugoslav perspective:
The character and consequences of NATO’s armed intervention are well 
known. Carried out without the consent of the Security Council, it represents 
a flagrant breach of the UN Charter and of the prohibition of the threat or use 
of force as one of the fundamental norms of international law....
Contemplated in a political sense, however, from our Yugoslav perspective, it 
can be regarded as one of the consequences of the general strategic orienta-
tion of Milošević’s regime, which from the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis 
in 1991 saw the use of armed force as the main instrument for solving prob-
lems of vital importance to the country without, moreover, taking any account 
whatsoever of the current degree of development of the organized interna-
tional community and international law.32
He explains Krivokapić’s negative answer to the question whether or not the 
institution of the right of humanitarian intervention should be introduced into the 
international law of 21st century:
...Today when war has been proclaimed an international crime and when the 
UN Charter forbids not only the use of force but also the threat of force, an 
inclination towards the doctrine of humanitarian intervention would open a 
very wide spectre of space for different kinds of abuse, and particularly for 
the promotion of selfish interests of the major world powers at the expense 
of smaller (weaker) states. Indeed, history teaches us that this is how it has 
always been in similar situations.33
The third view is ambiguous: while it recognizes that the Kosovo armed in-
tervention constituted a breach of international law, particularly the law of the 
Charter, it concludes that compelling moral and humanitarian justifications make 
it a case of only “minor” use of force involving no breach of jus cogens and, 
certainly, no case of aggression. This view separates necessary humanitarian in-
All the Relevant International Documents, Yugoslav Law 1/1999; G. Perazić, NATO i države 
članice kao strane u sukobu u agresiji na SR Jugoslaviju (NATO and the member states as pat-
ies in conflict in the aggression against SR Yugoslavia), Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno 
pravo, Vol. 46, 1-3, Belgrade, 1999, pp.124-134; Z. Vučinić, Međunarodno ratno i humani-
tarno pravo (International Martial and Humanitarian Law), Belgrade, 2006, pp. 69-72.
32 M. Šahović, Uloga Evropske unije u jugoslovenskoj krizi i odnos prema SR Jugoslaviji (Role of 
the European Union in the Yugoslav Crisis and Relations with SR Yugoslavia), Belgrade, 2000, 
p. 14.
33 B. Krivokapić, Međunarodno pravo – koreni, razvoj, perspektive (International Law – Sourc-
es, Development, Perspectives), Belgrade, 2006, pp. 216-217.
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tervention from a potential breach of the norms of jus cogens. The conclusion is 
absurd and unacceptable: where the use of force is an answer to a humanitarian 
need, it is less contrary to international law. Francioni therefore asks whether one 
can reasonably maintain that the NATO onslaught on Yugoslavia was a “minor” 
breach of the norm prohibiting the use of force, and adds:
...if words still have a function in identifying legal concepts, frankly, I do not 
see how we can use the term “minor” to describe such massive use of force 
and its impact on the law of the Charter and customary international law.34
The fourth view holds that the NATO air campaign in Kosovo was an interna-
tional wrongful act under traditional rules of international law on the use of force, 
but maintains that such traditional rules are undergoing progressive erosion in 
order to accommodate the emerging view requiring “positive” action to stop ex-
tensive violations of human rights that shock the conscience of humankind. Does 
this mean that the provisions of the Charter could be applied in a different way 
from the one conceived and created six decades ago? If today some provisions 
of the Charter (for instance, those concerning guardianship) are not applicable 
any more, then the argument of this view is persuasive and, in some parts, quite 
logical.
With respect to this view, Francioni points out:
It may be risky to re-invent an idea of international justice that is opposed to 
the Charter and to anchor its future development to such a shaky spot as the 
Kosovo crisis. In any case it is too early to draw conclusions in terms of ex 
post legalization of the intervention. There is no evidence yet of a widespread 
acceptance of its legality by the international community as a whole.35
At the end of Francioni’s classification of the juridical opinions on the NATO in-
tervention in 1999, it seems necessary to point out the view advocated by Charney:
...the Kosovo intervention reflects the problems of an undeveloped rule of law 
in a morally dangerous situation. It was actually an “anticipatory humani-
tarian intervention”.... Such intervention, like “anticipatory self-defence”, 
is a particularly dangerous permutation of an already problematic concept. 
Although many will share the view that the intervention was morally just in 
light of subsequent developments, it presents an unfortunate precedent.
Charney adds the following:
Perhaps the example of Kosovo may stimulate the development of a new rule 
of law that permits intervention by regional organizations to stop these crimes 
34 F. Francioni, o. c., pp.111.
35 See F. Francioni, o. c., pp.110-112.
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without the Security Council’s authorization, while limiting the risks of abuse 
and escalation. That is the task for the future.36
IV
Although it is a fact that after the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in 
1999 international law is faced with new challenges so that this may really be the 
beginning of a new era resulting in an exception from the general prohibition of 
the use of force, which will be grounded on the moral imperatives of saving the 
lives of innocent victims, at present it is impossible to accept the view according 
to which international law ought to be simply ignored whenever it is an obstacle 
to achieving goals of justice and humaneness. According to T Franck, the few 
writers who explicitly acknowledge the right to use force as extraordinary mea-
sures for preventing a humanitarian catastrophe either ignore the conditions for 
the formation of new principles of customary law or, on occasion, propose that 
the requirement of opinio juris be relaxed.37 Dixon and McCorquodale think that 
Franck has expressed the following carefully conditional opinion about the right 
of humanitarian intervention believing that a customary law is “beginning to take 
form”:
…A modern customary law of humanitarian intervention is beginning to take 
form which may condone action to protect lives, providing it is short and re-
sults in fewer casualties than would have resulted from non-intervention.38
B. Simma confirms that the prohibition of the use or threat of force as a uni-
versal principle of jus cogens is binding upon states individually and as members 
of international organizations such as NATO as well as upon the organizations 
themselves. Therefore, the use of force without the Security Council’s permis-
sion is not in accordance with the UN Charter. Yet, he expresses a more moderate 
view: 
…Alliance made every effort to get as close to legality as possible by, first, 
following the thrust of, and linking its efforts to, the Council resolutions 
which did exist and second, characterizing its action as an urgent measure to 
avert even greater humanitarian catastrophes in Kosovo, taken in a state of 
humanitarian necessity. 
36 J. I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, American Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 93, 4 (1999), p. 841.
37 T. Franck, Recourse to Force, 2002, p 191, quoted in I. Brownlie, o. c., p. 712.
38 M. Dixon, R. McCorquodale, o. c., p. 549.
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And he admits that there are really: 
“hard cases” in which terrible dilemmas must be faced and imperative po-
litical and moral considerations may appear to leave no choice but to act 
outside the law.39 
State practice as an argument proposed by those writers who support humani-
tarian intervention is unconvincing, particularly after the armed action against 
Yugoslavia for urgent humanitarian reasons in Kosovo. Dixon and McCorquodale 
argue that:
….There can be no doubt that the United Nations Charter can be modified by 
the congruent practice of the Member States crystallising as a new principle 
of customary law. But there is a burden of proof upon proponents of a change 
in the customary law. The central point is the absence of evidence of a change 
of view by majority of States.40
It is therefore especially important to mention the 23rd annual meeting of min-
isters of foreign affairs of Group 77 in New York on 24 September 1999, three 
months after the end of NATO’s armed action against SR Yugoslavia, which re-
sulted in a Ministerial declaration stating in Article 69 that the right of humani-
tarian intervention was not recognized. Article 69 states:
The Ministers stressed the need to maintain clear distinctions between hu-
manitarian assistance and other activities of the United Nations. They re-
jected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, which had no basis in 
the UN Charter or in international law.
In Article 70 the following is also stated:
...They noted that the response of international community to humanitarian 
emergencies was neither sufficient nor geographically balanced...41
The fact that this opinion was expressed by 132 states (among them, 23 Asian, 
51 African, 22 Latin American and 13 Arabian states)42 cannot be ignored, since 
it is the practice of states that ought to be a stronghold for recognising the right 
of humanitarian intervention. State practice has only known a few real cases of 
humanitarian intervention in the last two hundred years.43 
39 See: B. Simma, NATO, the UN and Use of Force: Legal Aspects, European Journal of Inter-
national Law, Vol. 10, 1(1999), pp.22.
40 M. Dixon, R. McCorquodale, o. c., p 551.
41 Ministerial declaration, p. 14.- http://www.g77.org/doc/Decl1999.html
42 Data from I. Brownlie, o. c., p 712.
43 On the cases of real humanitarian intervention see: V. Đ. Degan, Humanitarian intervention 
45
V
The existence of the right to intervene on humanitarian grounds is denied or 
criticized by a large majority of contemporary writers who put forward the fol-
lowing arguments: a) intervention is not in accordance with international law, b) 
in state practice, in the past, the right of intervention was abused in the majority 
of cases, c) today, state practice does not support the right of particular states to 
use force for humanitarian reasons44, d) danger that the conflict might escalate, 
e) intervention will never be applied in a consistent manner,45 f) humanitarian 
motives (predetermined goals) are never in harmony with the consequences of 
intervention,46 and g) the use of force should not be a decisive instrument for pro-
tecting human rights or for preventing their violations (such violations should be 
prevented systematically, and not only checked by striking back). 
With respect to the last two arguments attention should be paid to the pro-
nouncement of the International Court of Justice in the dispute between Nica-
ragua and the United States because of military and paramilitary activity in and 
against Nicaragua. Although the Court took account of the fact that in 1985 the 
United States Congress accused Nicaragua of human rights violation, it decided 
that:
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situ-
ation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not 
(NATO action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999) in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), 
Man’s Inhumanity to Man, 2003, pp. 244-246. 
44 According to Degan:
 …new alternative practice should become permanent, continuous and uniform so as to give 
rise to a consensus on the existence of a general legal awareness (opinio juris) that interven-
tion is permissible under a new rule of public international law. – V.Đ. Degan, Intervencija i 
međunarodno pravo (Intervention and international law), Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Rijeci, 
4 (1983), p.198.
45 This is actually the argument of uneven power relations. States that support the right of hu-
manitarian intervention in the territory of other states never assume a reciprocal obligation to 
tolerate the intervention of other states in their own territories. Intervention must be applied 
consistently, irrespective of region or nation because, as emphasized by K. Annan in his Report 
of 20 September 1999, after all, humanity is indivisible. In reality, humanitarian intervention 
is possible only against smaller and, perhaps, middle-ranking states. It is difficult to imagine, 
even in theory, a situation where for humanitarian reasons, out of extreme necessity, force 
could be applied against a powerful state. Humanitarian intervention seems probable exclu-
sively in situations of uneven relations, since the intervening state always has to be more 
powerful than the state against which measures are taken.
46 NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia, according to Krivokapić’s investigation, resulted in a 
humanitarian, economic, ecological and institutional catastrophe as well as interethnic intoler-
ance. See B. Krivokapić, o.c., p. 218-219. 
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be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. With regard to 
the steps actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitar-
ian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction 
of oil installations, or again with the training, arming and equipping of the 
contras. The Court concludes that the argument derived from the preserva-
tion of human rights in Nicaragua cannot afford a legal justification for the 
conduct of the United States, and cannot in any event be reconciled with the 
legal strategy of the respondent State, which is based on the right of collective 
self-defence.47  
In his aforementioned report K. Annan holds that in reality the use of force on 
humanitarian grounds is in each case a result of failure in the prevention of crimes 
against humanity. Therefore it is the obligation of the international community to 
develop and improve its ability to prevent violations of human rights. He argues 
for a transition from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention, since it is 
doubtless that:
Even the costliest policy of prevention is far cheaper, in lives and in resourc-
es, than the least expensive use of armed force.48
We may support some of these arguments and refute others, but there can be 
no quarrel with the logic of the criticism levelled at the argument about the abuse 
of the right of humanitarian intervention, which is explained in detail by R. Hig-
gins:
…Many writers do argue against the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention 
today. They make much of the fact that in the past the right has been abused. 
It undoubtedly has. But then so have there been countless abusive claims of 
the right to self-defence. That does not lead us to say that there should be no 
right of self-defence today. We must face the reality that we live in a decen-
tralized international legal order, where claims may be made either in good 
faith or abusively. We delude ourselves if we think that the role of norms is to 
remove the possibility of abusive claims ever being made. The role of norms 
is the achievement of values for the common good.
Nor am I persuaded by another, related argument sometimes advanced – that 
humanitarian intervention should be regarded as impermissible, because, in 
the international legal system, there is no compulsory reference to impartial 
decision-makers, and states finish up judges in their own cause. There are a 
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, pp 134-135.
48 Report of the Secretary-General, 1999, p. 4.
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variety of important decision-makers, other than courts, who can pronounce 
on the validity of claims advanced; and claims which may in very restricted 
exceptional circumstances be regarded as lawful should not a priori be disal-
lowed because on occasion they may be unjustly invoked.49 
Since humanitarian intervention is not expressly regulated by a rule of in-
ternational law, in the debate about it Degan takes as a starting point the conflict 
between international law and international reality, a conflict between the norma-
tive and the real, quoting Rousseau:
…There has always been certain discord between the statement of norms that 
ought to regulate international relations (the principle of restraint or non-
intervention) and the state of practice which, on the other hand, manifests 
itself in the frequency of interventions. Any study of this matter must take as 
its mainstay this duality of imperfection in international relations.50
Therefore, the de lege ferenda conditions that exclude the faultiness of inter-
vention could be as follows:
systematic, repeated and large-scale international crimes must have been a) 
committed by a State’s authorities or with their compliance, against their 
own population,
any such situation must itself be a “threat to the peace”,b) 
in these exceptional circumstances, an organization of States which c) 
undertakes a humanitarian intervention not authorized by the Security 
Council, acts in the general interest,
no State participating in the intervention should benefit from the action,d) 
a collective intervention by several States should be preferred to the inter-e) 
vention by a single State acting in the name of others or of an organiza-
tion of States, 
in the enforcement action no international crimes must be committed, a) 
especially not against civilians and other protected persons.51
According to Evans there has to be convincing evidence of:
extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring urgent relief,a) 
it must be objectively clear that there is no practical alternative to the use b) 
of force to save lives,
49 See R. Higgins, Problems and Process – International Law and How We Use it, Oxford, 2003, 
pp 247-248.
50 Quoted in V. Đ. Degan, o. c., p. 170.
51 V. Đ. Degan, Humanitarian intervention (NATO action against the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia in 1999) in L. C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man, 2003, pp. 248-250. 
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any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the humanitarian c) 
purpose and carried out in accordance with international law, 
the military action must be likely to achieve its objectives,d) 
any use of force must be collective.e) 52
When all these conditions are fulfilled, Degan rightly puts a new and difficult 
question whether an intervention satisfying all the above criteria is, according 
to general international law, a legal obligation of the intervening states, or their 
right, or simply a possibility.
VI
Finally, it should be concluded that owing to the overarching importance of 
human rights in modern international law and because of the obsolescence of the 
Security Council monopoly on the authorization of force with the blocking power 
of the veto, even in 21st century, by one of the five permanent members, the right 
of humanitarian intervention is still one of the most sensitive legal and political 
questions for the international community which has not yet reached a consensus 
about it. Therefore any discussion or effort with an aim to formulate an answer is 
a real challenge and also a contribution to the science of international law.
Will a firm commitment to humanitarian purposes alone be sufficient for the 
institution of humanitarian intervention to be introduced into international law? 
Should the principles of humanity and of the protection of human rights have pri-
ority over the principle of prohibition of the use or threat of force? The answer is 
complex because the entire structure of humanitarian intervention has so far been 
tarnished by the application of a dual standard in some humanitarian disasters 
in the world. Humanitarian motivation has not always been sincere. It has often 
served as an excuse for achieving geopolitical and military-strategic goals. In such 
situations international law can really return to the time before the use and threat 
of force were prohibited. This is why discussions about this important question 
seem indispensable and useful, and why the United Nations must, in spite of all 
their weaknesses, continue to be the only international organization within which 
the mechanism of force may (even where the highest humanitarian values are in 
question) be set in motion. Kofi Annan has explained why this is so:
Because, despite its limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a human-
ity that cares more, not less, for the suffering in its midst, and a humanity that will 
do more, and not less, to end it.
We will succeed only if we all adapt our Organization to a world with new 
actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress.
  (Translated by Mirjana Bonačić)
52 Malcolm D. Evans, o. c., p. 597.
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Sažetak
(Ne) Dopustivost humanitarne intervencije
U Povelji Ujedinjenih naroda i suvremenom međunarodnom pravu nema 
pravnog uporišta (izvora) o dopustivosti uporabe sile kako bi se spriječili masov-
ni zločini protiv civilnog stanovništva, etničko čišćenje ili umanjile teške povrede 
ljudskih prava unutar granica neke države.  Formalno, svaka prijetnja silom ili 
uporaba sile kao sredstva kojim bi se zaustavila humanitarna katastrofa nedozvo-
ljeni je čin. S druge se pak strane, velika i sustavna kršenja ljudskih prava koja 
su propisana i regulirana međunarodnim ugovorima (donijetim poslije Povelje) 
ne mogu više smatrati isključivo pitanjima unutrašnjega prava. O tome može li 
se u krajnjoj nuždi kada su ispunjeni uvjeti moralne, etičke i humanitarne prirode 
prijeći granicu dopustivosti i intervenciju smatrati pravednom, humanom i moral-
nom u znanosti međunarodnog prava nema  konsenzusa. Povezivanje onoga što je 
pravno nedopustivo sa osjećajem humanosti i predanosti humanim vrijednostima 
oduvijek je bio privilegij samo moćnih. Državama koje su pokazivale dovoljno 
interesa za oružanu intervenciju humanitarni motiv je vrlo često bio samo isprika 
za akciju i uglavnom nije bio u suglasnosti s posljedicama intervencije. Stoga 
praksa država danas ne daje podršku pravu pojedinih država na uporabu sile zbog 
humanitarnih razloga. Pravo na humanitarnu intervenciju i u 21. stoljeću ostaje 
jedno od najsenzibilnijih pravno političkih pitanja međunarodne  zajednice, zbog 
sveprisutne važnosti ljudskih prava u suvremenom međunarodnom pravu s jedne 
strane i zbog zastarjelog monopola  Vijeća sigurnosti nad odobravanjem uporabe 
sile - s blokirajućim vetom pet stalnih članica - s druge strane. Ujedinjeni narodi 
bi uz sve svoje slabosti i dalje morali ostati jedina struktura unutar koje može biti 
pokrenut mehanizam uporabe sile. 
Ključne riječi: Kršenja ljudskih prava, humane intervencije, međunarodno pra-
vo, Ujedinjeni narodi, NATO
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